Security Rings Versus Patches

This is the second in a series of blog posts suggesting solutions to terrorist threat to aviation security, in the U.S. and abroad.

Chameleon Associates has been providing counter terrorism training and consultation for many years with the ultimate goal of changing mindsets about security.  We know that the adoption of our logical, proven and effective measures and methods will save lives.  In this second blog post we cover SECURITY RINGS.

INSTEAD OF SECURITY RINGS, WE HAVE PATCHES.

The concept of establishing security rings around a protected target is not new to professionals in the field. The model of security rings entails the implementation of layered obstacles, countermeasures and screening points that are extended outwards from a protected environment and target. This layered approach increases the likelihood of capturing the criminal or terrorist at one of the outer security rings before he reaches the target.  If designed correctly, security rings add complexity to the security system that in turn makes the target less desirable for the adversary.

And although this is sensible security concept, security rings are not widely implemented, especially in aviation security.  Instead of rings, we have security patches.  Why?

Although the TSA, airport police, airlines, private security contractors, U.S. Air Marshals and others are working against a common enemy, they are divided by differing authority levels, security operating procedures (SOP), training and mission objectives.  The TSA is responsible mainly for the security checkpoints.  Airport police are in charge of the public areas, airport periphery, runways and gates – among other areas.  Air Marshals are in charge of security aboard planes.  Private security companies secure cargo warehouses, airport access points and more.  Airlines have security functions on board the plane and in cursory screening of their passenger population.

Because each security ring has its own jurisdiction, independent SOP and training, it’s likely that for example, a person deemed suspicious by police officers in the airport parking lot will receive no special attention or procedures by the TSA or airlines, e.g. a seat assignment that allows air marshals and flight crew to easily observe his moves.  It’s a bit like conquer and divide.  The discrete (and sometimes divergent) security patches don’t total up to a strong security ring – and that’s what’s needed.

HERE IS A SOLUTION:

• All agencies whose job it is to protect against terrorism must work under a common SOP.  The SOP must include specific instructions on what to do with a suspicious person or object as it moves from the outer rings (airport periphery) to most inner ring (on board the plane).
• Information about a person or object deemed suspicious or threatening must be communicated to each ring.
• All the rings in the security system must have common training geared toward terrorism prevention and not law enforcement.

FOR AVIATION SECURITY, WE NEED THREAT MITIGATION, NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT.

Airport police units are by definition law enforcement driven. Their mission (supported by training and procedures) is geared towards enforcing the law or preventing a crime, rather than mitigating threat.  That makes it challenging for officers to deal with a threatening situation when no laws have been broken.  If a person is deemed suspicious for maybe conducting surveillance, a dry run or even about to execute an attack – traditional police practices are insufficient.

Yet airport police officers are positioned behind TSA checkpoints.  There is no logical reason for them to be there unless their function is to mitigate the terrorist threat.  The methods for dealing with criminals are quite different than those used to deal with an individual suspected of being part of a terrorist plot (as the attacker, as a mule or as an accomplice).

HERE IS A SOLUTION:

• First and foremost, security should not be a function of law enforcement and having them installed at TSA checkpoints is a waste of resources.  Instead of police officers, armed security officers with similar training to that of air marshals should take over most of airport policing functions.
• However, if law enforcement is to be used, train them on how to conduct security questioning, equip them with procedures on how to deal with a suspect who is not a criminal to include extensive search, delay, intelligence driven questioning, counter-surveillance, information gathering and dissemination.
• Move law enforcement in front of the TSA checkpoint and instruct them to conduct a customer service oriented questioning of people waiting in line.  It makes for better use of resources and boosts  man power.

SECURE AGAINST ACTUAL, NOT PAST THREATS.

Security rings should be designed and maintained against the adversary and his anticipated methods of operation.  They are too often designed against the attack we experienced yesterday and not the attack we could experience tomorrow.  This is why airport security resources are almost entirely devoted to deal with the passenger route of possible infiltration. Most terrorist attacks against aviation have been conducted by passengers but given the lack of security attention to other areas of airport operations, it is very likely that the next terrorist attacks will be committed by an airport employee or subcontractor with access to the plane, the airfreight, the catering carts, etc.

As an example, nowadays a 9/11 style terrorist hijacking is more probable to occur on cargo planes than on passenger planes.  Gaining access via janitorial crews, baggage handlers, and catering kitchens with an explosive device is, in many ways, much simpler than infiltrating security as a passenger. These operational environments are too easy to penetrate and exploit.  And these employees are not sufficiently vetted.

HERE IS A SOLUTION:

• We must delegate security resources based on what threat is and not based on what the threat was.  And we need to implement adequate access control procedures for catering kitchens and cargo facilities.
• We need to go beyond basic criminal background checks when screening airport employees.  We need to interview and assess the employee on a periodic basis to establish if there are reasons to fear hostile intent or vulnerability for being exploited.

The threat isn’t going away but luckily, the solutions are not beyond our reach.  Politics aside, establishing security rings that reflect actual terrorist threats,  tightening security operating procedures to encompass all parties engaged in securing the airport, planes and passengers, implementing comprehensive training across the board, insisting on clear and immediate communication between rings – this is what’s needed.