Last week the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested several persons in Ontario, Canada for alleged terrorist offenses which included plotting to blow up targets in Canada and funneling money to Afghani insurgents fighting Canadian soldiers. They were arrested for their activities in the planning stages of a potential attack. Police have emphasized that this group had been under surveillance for about a year, and was months away from execution.

Clearly, the most successful counter terrorism efforts are those that nip activities in the bud, at a distance from execution.

(As an aside, because I cannot resist the temptation, one of the arrestees, Dr. Khurram Sher, a London, Ontario pathologist had auditionned in 2008 for Canadian Idol and can be seen on youtube moonwalking to his rendition of “Complicated” by Avril Lavigne.)  The world of terrorists is indeed complicated.  We would do well to study the factions, tenets and tangents of the Muslim world.  I found the following interview with Tarek Fatah to this point and very interesting.  He was interviewed by the CBC about the recent arrests, and was asked about the increase of homegrown terrorists in Canada and the radicalization of Muslims. See the video below.

Facebook has been plagued with another viral scam – the false “dislike” button.  Of course the irony is that many Facebook users have been asking for such a button, to complement the existing, legitimate “like” button.  Apparently Facebook users want to be able criticize as well as show encouragement for user posts.  This demand was taken advantage of by scammers who offered up a malicious, faux dislike button installation that once it obtains access the user’s profile posts spam from the user’s account.

On top of this, the world is speeding up.  We are impatient and accept nothing less than instant.  According to a recent survey, it seems that college kids are finding email “too slow” and instead are opting for IM or SMS.  (SMS is winning the pack; it integrates with social networks and interacts over multiple platforms.

The combination of our impatience and dependence concerns me.  When we move too fast we tend to miss things, our awareness is down.  Dependence is another state of mind that also fogs up our thinking.  It makes for fertile ground and statistics show that the scams are outrunning us.  We are all clicking and sharing and up and downloading with great abandon.  For individual users, and depending on the situation, the worst case scenarios are pretty unpleasant: disruption of communication, identity fraud which could lead to fiscal fraud, social embarrassment.  I am getting the impression that as technology advances, our privacy is even less assured because the distance between malicious idea and defense against it is getting shorter.

We automatically and rapidly share and accept online communication and personal information on social networks, such as Facebook.  The line between what is public and private is diminishing.  Perhaps some people don’t consider that they have lost control of their data.  But once a photo, message or video is uploaded, you don’t know where it goes and can’t take it back.  Erasing your social identity is, basically, impossible.  Google security advises to watch out for suspicious links.  I agree but would also recommend, in general, to think twice before you hit ‘enter’.

Sometimes it seems the distinction between counter terrorism versus counter insurgency gets blurred.   After all, if the war on terror is global, what’s the difference if it’s being fought over here, or over there?  Indeed, the main issue distinguishing these efforts is where the enemy is operating.  In terrorism, they are working within your environment.  With insurgents, you are fighting them in theirs. 

Timelines for withdrawal aside, the Petraeus COIN doctrine spells out neatly the strategies to win a battle that go well beyond firepower to political, diplomatic, psychological, economic and social concerns.  A war of hearts, minds and pockets.  Alas, with few exceptions, most counter insurgencies fail.  Absent brutal broad strokes that decimate a population beyond the insurgents themselves (the U.S. versus native Americans, or vs. the Philippines at the turn of the 20^th c), insurgency is a real challenge to counter.  How many such campaigns can you count that have succeeded?

Although some would put them under the same wide umbrella, terrorism and insurgency are fundamentally different.  While both terrorize, operationally they deal with different considerations and even immediate objectives.  Here are a couple of ways they differ:

• To commit a successful terrorist attack usually takes 1-5 years to plan; to commit a successful insurgent attack could take only hours to plan, even less.
• Insurgents usually operate in larger, sectarian or tribal groups; terrorists – even if they belong to a large terrorist operation – their operational units are small.
• Depending on their capabilities, insurgents use military guerilla tactics; terrorists maneuver more like an intelligence operative does: infiltration, recruitment, using covers, etc.

In modern times, and especially against democratic regimes like the U.S. and the West, insurgents find terrorism an attractive means for obtaining their political objectives.  The Madrid train bombings in 2004 are a good example of how a terrorist attack succeeded in removing a country from its territory.  That would not have occurred if a Spanish soldier(s) had been assassinated in Iraq.

In counter terrorism the adversary is the odd man out.   In counter insurgency, it is the target (soldier) that deviates from the norm.  In some geographic locations, activities swing between counter insurgency and counter terrorism.   When the military protects its own bases in Afghanistan, it is conducting counter terrorism.  But when that military moves to the streets of Kabul, it is engaging in counter insurgency.  Of course, on the periphery of the base and the outskirts of Kabul, what is being countered is less clear.

Contrary to promises from the TSA that backscatter X-ray scanned images could not be saved or transmitted electronically, it appears that over 35,000 images were indeed saved – at a single Orlando Florida court house location, and who knows where else.  This news arrives on the heels of DHS Director Napolitano’s statement that these scanners are intended for deployment at all major airports in the United States. 

Privacy advocates are upset by this and other disclosures that have been trickling out about the capacity of the equipment and procedures for its use.   EPIC (Electronic Privacy Information Center) has filed a lawsuit against the DHS to stop the program in its tracks.  The TSA defends itself and assures that the image recording functions are turned off when the body scanners are delivered to airports. 

For the prudes amongst us, all this just fuels our fears of exposure.  We were looking for administrative transparency, not clothing transparency.  We want to have faith in the system and its leaders.  The notion of the system having an electronic ’private parts’ mask to protect privacy, makes stuffing a jock strap with explosives a no brainer, for a would be terrorist.  Speaking for myself, if I were more confident that the system as a whole were really working, then I might willingly submit to a body scan.  Having to choose real safety over momentary self consciousness, I would grudgingly choose the former.  The only problem is that I am not yet convinced as to the safety part.

The NYC Metropolitan Transit Authority launched its If You See Something, Say Something campaign eight years ago and the logo has since been licensed to over 50 organizations.  The program is now expanding its reach into General Aviation.  Explaining why the DHS  is adopting a program for that sector, U.S. Secretary of HLS Napolitano noted that “Time and again we have seen the role the public can play in helping alert authorities to potential terrorist plots or criminal activity.”  She was addressing an audience at the annual Oshkosh air show.

Detractors of the General Aviation Secure Program claim that the sector is managing its security just fine,

 following TSA security guidelines and that the program would be a waste of money.  Others question the effectiveness of asking a population that knows little about terrorist methods, to work on the front lines of security.  And still other critics note that back in May, the street vendor who alerted police in Times Square to the bomb-filled SUV, did not call the MTA emergency number.  He used common sense to alert police, as most people would if and when they see something ‘going down’.

Me, I think it’s a good campaign that has increased general public awareness to the issue of terrorism, and enhanced individuals’ sense of personal responsibility.  Some cities are installing extensive CCTV systems as part of their security measures.  But unlike a camera, a pedestrian, passenger or vendor can not only see the suspicious object or person, but can cognitively assess the potential threat in context and in that moment inform the appropriate authority. 

What would make this See and Say program a true force multiplier would be to educate people more precisely about terrorist modes of operation.  And about predictive assessment methods.  These are generally useful tools that anyone can use within any environment or situation – beyond that of General Aviation.

Nadia and Paul Rockwood were arrested by the FBI and last week pleaded guilty to charges of domestic terrorism which involved plotting the assassination of more than a dozen targets. The targets were people whom Paul, a convert to Islam and a follower of Anwar al-Awlaki, had identified as having desecrated Islam. It was to be his violent contribution to the Jihadi war against America.

This is a disconcerting story.  One wonders gee, which of my neighbors or colleagues is other than what they seem?  Heaven forbid we start spying on our neighbors and in any event, as the Rockwood case illustrates, it would not have helped.  According to friends and neighbors, nothing in their demeanor or conversation would have given them away.

The thread that no doubt lead the FBI to Alaska was the al-Awlaki connection.  The cleric casts a mesmerizing spell and Rockwood wasn’t the first to fall for it.  Keeping tabs on webs woven by the al-Awlakis of our world, scouring all sources for good intelligence and learning all we can about the fanaticism that fuels terrorists seems to be the best path for mitigating the threat of domestic terrorism.

I recently watched a reality TV show whose subject is the security force at one of the world’s largest retail malls.  The show is aptly named Mall Cops: Mall of America (airs on the TLC network Thursday nights 10E/9C).  No ordinary mall, the Mall of America draws over 40 million visitors a year.  Covering some 3 million square feet, this immense property is located spitting distance from the Minneapolis-St. Paul International airport and also houses a metro transit hub.

It is an American capitalist institution and therefore, alas, a potential target for terrorists. 

 Securing this behemoth is no easy task, but then the MOA team is no ordinary security force.  Its members are carefully vetted, many are retired military or aspiring law enforcement officers.  But more to my point, its force is also carefully trained.  Under the watchful eye of Captain Mike Rozin, a counter terrorism professional, officers are trained to look for indicators of threat in context.  They are trained in engaging people in open ended questioning – a critically valuable skill.  They know how to profile behavior and they understand their adversaries.  The MOA security program has received awards and is lauded as one of the best around.

I applaud MOA for its commitment to professionalism and for going the extra mile.  I believe that the strategies they have implemented could be used to great effect in protecting many other environments and that programs such as theirs should be the bar against which security programs are measured.

Host to the 2010 World Cup, South Africa took tremendous security measures employing over 40,000 police, clamping down on route and border security, building command centers, establishing surveillance and using state of the art communications technology.  They also received the full cooperation of the international community in preventing criminal and security threats to the event.  I applaud the success of these $170 million security efforts and believe they acted as a deterrent to those who would have gladly attacked the games.  Who? For example, Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage, spokesperson for Al Shabab, the Islamic militia trying to impose its extreme form of Sharia law on the Somali population while waging an insurgent war against the Somali government.  No fan of the sport, the Sheikh has likened soccer to a satanic act.

And so it is no coincidence that in Kampala, Uganda soccer fans watching the final game between Spain and the Netherlands were struck in terrorist bombings at two different locations on Sunday that killed at least 74 people.  Al Shabab terrorists have taken responsibly for these attacks, reiterating their stance that soccer is a satanic pursuit and counter to the strict version of Islam they would impose in Southern Somali.  Earlier this month in Mogadishu, an Al Shabab ally, Hizbul Islam, murdered two young soccer fans and arrested two dozen others for watching the games. 

Sunday’s attack in Uganda  is one of the first Al Shabab has made outside of Somalia and some fear it may represent a beginning of attacks in other neighboring countries who have until now received only rhetorical threats.

One wonders what measures are necessary for stemming the tide of fanatic terrorism on the African continent.

Mosab Hassan Yousef is once again in the news.  We last heard of him at the launch of his book Son of Hamas , detailing his experiences as a Palestinian spy working for Israel’s Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency).  Lately, he had been busy fighting a deportation attempt by the U.S. government on the basis that Mr. Yousef consorted with terrorists.  Since then he has been granted asylum.  Aside from the deportation attempt, the story of Mr. Yousef raises questions that have not been asked by the media covering the case.  What really caused him to flip?

Intelligence handlers will tell you that it takes profound and very personal motives to leverage a betrayal and to convince someone to become an agent despite the fatal risks involved.

Mr. Yousef is no run of the mill young man.  He is the son of the founder of Hamas, and was raised in a very closed Arab Muslim society where one is a member of a social group first, where family, status, honor, religion and culture define you as a person.  Maintaining one’s honor and that of your family is everything.  You are an individual only secondarily.  In such a close knit environment, betrayal has only one fate: death.  In order to motivate someone to commit a betrayal of this magnitude, a HUMINT source operator must rely on a very, very strong motive.  In this case it could be any social deviation, for example a sexual one, or committing a dishonorable act.

Mr. Yousef enjoyed special status and was the heir apparent to head Hamas; money does not seem to have been an obvious motivator.  According to his book and to reports, the recruitment took place in prison where at least among the Palestinian prisoners his status would have been very high and would have garnered him a certain level of protection and respect.  Yousef claimed to have been ‘shocked’ by the Hamas behaviors he saw in prison yet these were people he had grown up around.  He had been groomed to be a terrorist.  He was privy to the stories and exploits of Hamas members including de facto ex-prisoners of Israeli prisons.  It seems unlikely that anything he saw of his fellow inmates would have been a revelation and further, that what he learned about Hamas there rendered him a traitor.  (Side note: his conversion to Christianity occurred after his cross over to the Israelis.)

The explanations he provides in his book and interviews about his reasons for flipping, seem not to hold water, specifically to those who understand the society and close familial structure in which he operated.  These explanations may satisfy a western audience as plausible but are not convincing to professional HUMINT operators and/or to those who come his background.

Mr. Yousef acknowledges that he “was a traitor, to my family, to my nation, to my God.  I crossed all the red lines in my society.  I didn’t leave one that I didn’t cross.”

The intensely strong motivation that would fuel his willingness to betray everything in his life, may not yet or ever be identified.  One wonders why Yousef hasn’t yet been assassinated by Hamas for this phenomenal betrayal.  It may be that the circumstances that fueled his willingness to betray is the very thing protecting his life.  Perhaps killing him would reveal the circumstances that – in and of themselves – are far more damaging to Hamas and his family.

Chameleon signed a teaming agreement with Chartrand Fortin Labelle Solutions inc. (CFL) a Quebec based consulting firm specialized in public and corporate security. Under the new agreement CFL will translate and deliver Chameleon courses to the French Speaking market.

Last week (June 22-23, 2010), CFL and Chameleon jointly delivered a Predictive Profiling and Security Questioning seminar in Laval, Quebec. The seminar was a great success and it was attended by government and corporate security officials from across Canada. The audience received practical tools to assist them in the implementation of a Predictive Profiling based security system. A system that makes extensive use of security questioning, red teaming and adversarial thinking to maintain a high level of efficiency and effectiveness.

Clients who seek Chameleon Courses in French should contact CFL or Chameleon Associates for more information.

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Chameleon a conclu une entente avec Chartrand Fortin Labelle solutions inc. (CFL), une firme conseil basée au Québec, spécialisée en sûreté corporative et sécurité publique.  Selon les conditions de cette entente, CFL se chargera d’effectuer la traduction et de donner la formation de Chameleon au marché francophone.

Les 22 et 23 juin 2010, CFL et Chameleon se sont associés afin d’offrir la formation sur le Predictive Profiling and Security Questioning à Laval, Québec.  La formation a été une réussite.  Plusieurs responsables gouvernementaux et professionnels de sécurité corporative de différentes régions du Canada y ont assisté.  Les participants ont appris des techniques et ont reçu une gamme d’outils pratiques pour les aider à mettre en œuvre un système de sécurité basé sur le Predictive Profiling.  Ce système se sert du questionnement de sécurité, du red team et de la façon de penser de l’adversaire afin d’assurer un haut degré d’efficacité.

Les clients intéressés à suivre cette formation en français peuvent contacter CFL ou Chameleon Associates afin d’obtenir de l’information supplémentaire.